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The current emergency response concept for the International Space Station (ISS) includes the support of
the Flight Control Team. Therefore, the team members need to be trained in emergencies and the cor-
responding crew procedures to ensure a smooth collaboration between crew and ground. In the case
where the astronaut and ground personnel training is not collocated it is a challenging endeavor to
ensure and maintain proper knowledge and skills for the Flight Control Team. Therefore, a virtual 3D
simulator at the Columbus Control Center (Col-CC) is presented, which is used for ground personnel
training in the on-board emergency response. The paper brieﬂy introduces the main ISS emergency
scenarios and the corresponding response strategy, details the resulting learning objectives for the Flight
Controllers and elaborates on the new simulation method, which will be used in the future. The status of
the 3D simulator, ﬁrst experiences and further plans are discussed.
& 2016 IAA. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Operation of a manned platform in space like the International
Space Station (ISS) requires concepts for emergency cases [1]. The
procedures which are available for those cases are designed for
maximum crew autonomy to avoid critical dependencies on
communication equipment and hence on the link to Mission
Control. However, in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) regime with ne-
glegtable communication delays the Mission Control Center can
still provide a valuable support to the emergency response of the
on-board astronauts.
For that reason not only the astronauts need to be extensively
trained in the various emergency response strategies, also the
Flight Control Teams need training in it.
The ﬁrst level here is classroom training, which conveys the
theoretical knowledge and contains ﬁrst walk-throughs of the
procedures.
The second level is simulations, during which the Flight Control
Team is put into a real control room in a real operational context
with simulated data stream and commanding with trainers role-
playing the astronauts, who read down a pre-scripted scenario.rights reserved.The difﬁculty here is that the trainer is in many cases not the
expert in the on-board emergency handling, since they are in
some setups not involved in the corresponding crew training, so
imitating the crew during the simulation is difﬁcult; and involving
a real astronaut in the simulations is often difﬁcult due to their
busy schedules.
At the Columbus Control Center (Col-CC) in Oberpfaffenhofen/
Germany, one of the ﬁve main control centers for the ISS [2], a
novel virtual reality simulator was developed for emergency si-
mulations, which allows one to also “play” the crew part of the
scenario. With that approach, the “crew” can also be played by a
corresponding Flight Control Team member, which increases the
ﬁdelity of the simulation, since a proven expert in the emergency
ﬁeld is now also involved in the “on-board part”. For that person it
has the additional training effect that also the crew part of the
emergency is reinforced and an even better and more integrated
understanding of the response strategy is acquired.2. ISS emergency response
Beside medical emergencies [3], which are of low relevance for
the Flight Control Team due to the fact that they are not directly
involved, there are three major technical emergencies deﬁned for
the International Space Station. A ﬁre can directly endanger the
Fig. 1. The ISS ﬁre strategy (from ISS emergency books, not publicly accessible).
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meteoroid or orbital debris strike can lead to a perforation of the
station's shell and can cause a loss of the vital air. The atmosphere
on-board can be poisoned by the release of toxic substances, e.g. in
case ammonia used in the external cooling loop enters the internal
cooling water system due to a rupture of an interface heat ex-
changer and is subsequently ending up in the cabin air.
For all emergencies the crew is extensively trained to be able to
immediately execute from memory the so-called “Common
Emergency Response”: As an initial step everybody's attention
needs to be drawn to the dangerous situation. For that, the ISS
wide alarm system is activated. This is either done automatically,
in case the vehicle's sensors have detected the emergency condi-
tion (smoke detectors, pressure sensors, pressure increase in the
cooling water loop), by a Flight Controller observing emergency
clues in their telemetry or by the crew pressing the emergency
button (visible smoke, burning odor, detected air pressure drop,
observed toxic spill or other signatures).
The ISS wide alarm (“Caution and Warning” subsystem) is also
broadcasted to all ISS control centers and also causes an emer-
gency alarm message to be released, providing some level of detail
(class of emergency, location, failed equipment) to the Flight
Control Team. The alarm message might be accompanied by voice
communications with the crew.
The crew then gathers and establishes a so-called safe haven,
essentially a zone in which it is safe to stay, has the required
emergency response equipment, a computer to command the
space station and a clear exit path to the Soyuz spacecraft, which
act as rescue ships of the space station. It is then at the com-
mander's discretion to decide if the crew either starts with the
emergency speciﬁc response procedures [5], or immediately
evacuates the station.
The station control software will simultaneously take action.
Depending on the emergency case and its initiation (manually or
automatically) it executes various actions which aim at two main
objectives: to stop/limit the source of the emergency and its pro-
pagation and to assist the crew in their response strategies.
The personnel in the control rooms stop all current operations
immediately and fully focus on the emergency case. The lead is
either with the Mission Control Houston or with the Moscow
Control Center, depending on the on board location of the emer-
gency. After that the main tasks of the ﬂight control teams are to
check the automatic software response of the space station, the
search for indicators in case the emergency source is unknown and
ﬁnally the support of the crew, who is of course prime in the
emergency response.
In the following sections the detailed strategies reﬂected in the
procedures in response to an on-board ISS emergency will brieﬂy
be described, sorted by cases. Before doing that, it's important to
keep in mind that the priorities followed by the real time oper-
ating policy are: Crew safety, vehicle safety and mission success.
These priorities are emphasized and further detailed in the stra-
tegies developed for the response to an on-board emergency
event.
2.1. Fire Emergency
After the execution of the Common Emergency Response, the
emergency annunciation (if not yet done) and the determination
of air quality and a ﬁre classiﬁcation is done. All these steps are
part of the Initial Response, as depicted in Fig. 1.
For the classiﬁcation step, two cases can be distinguished: In
case there are visible ﬂames or smoke, the air quality per deﬁni-
tion is considered poor and the crew is immediately required to
don the Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA) or the equivalent
Russian equipment, which constitute an independent oxygensupply for the crew and are available all over the space station. In
case of no visible clues of the ongoing ﬁre, crew is required to
utilize dedicated Compound Speciﬁc Analysers (CSA) for Com-
bustion Products (CP) to determine the quality of the air. In case
certain limits for ﬁre byproducts are exceeded, crew is again re-
quired to wear breathing protection.
If after the initial response crew is considered safe for the
moment, then they can decide about the secondary response.
During the secondary response crew changes from PBAs to
dedicated Emergency Masks. These masks do not provide oxygen,
but ﬁlter the surrounding air. They are only available in a central
repository in the Russian segment, but have a much longer ex-
piration duration than the PBAs.
The ﬁrst step in the secondary response is the actual search for
the ﬁre location. Here, various clues are used: Sensory (odor,
smoke concentration or direction), telemetry indications (tripped
equipment, increased temperature), warning lights. In addition
again the CSA-CPs provide measurements for each module and
following increasing values leads to the suspected module. In the
identiﬁed module, the crew uses dedicated probes on the CSA-CPs,
which are inserted in the ﬁre ports. These are distributed all over
Fig. 2. The ISS depress strategy (from ISS emergency books, not publicly
accessible).
T. Uhlig et al. / Acta Astronautica 128 (2016) 513–520 515the module and allow access behind the various panels and to the
inside of racks.
After identiﬁcation of the location, the ﬁre needs to be ex-
tinguished. A hierarchical approach is followed: First step is the
removal of power to the affected equipment or area. Next level is
the usage and discharge of the CO2 ﬁre extinguisher if required. In
that case crew has to switch from the Emergency Masks to PBAs
again due to the increased CO2 level after the discharge. If the ﬁre
is still not eliminated (criteria: stable or decreasing CSA-CP read-
ings), the module is fully or partially powered down.
After that the next step is the isolation of the affected module.
In case the crew still feels safe to enter the module, they will at-
tempt to retrieve important equipment parts before the hatch is
closed. It is important to be aware that the module might be dark
after a potential complete power-down, crew is then guided by the
phosphorescing Emergency Egress Guidance System (EEGS). Fi-
nally various post-ﬁre clean-up strategies will be discussed.
2.2. Rapid Depress
The strategy developed for the response to a Rapid Depress
event takes into account the number of crew members who are on
board: If only 3 crew members are on-board, the strategy takes
into account the docked location of their Soyuz. In the case of
9 crew members 3 take care of the leak check of their Soyuz while
the rest is applying the 6 crew member strategy described
hereafter.
As for the previous emergency event the response strategy can
be split in two parts, as shown in Fig. 2: an “Initial Response”
whose steps deal with saving the crew and a “Secondary Response”
for the vehicle and mission safety. The ﬁrst step is the memorized
Common Emergency Response, which is executed by the crew.
Next step is then to perform pressure measurements and to
determine the leak rate and hence the time until critical pressure
values are reached, the so-called Reserve Time (T.res). For this task
the crew relies on robust mechanical handheld Russian equipment
(Manovacumeter) to measure the absolute pressure, and on graphs
in the emergency books which correlate the initial pressure and
the duration of a pressure drop by 1 mmHg with the expected
Reserve Time.
The absolute pressure value dictates whether protection
equipment (the already mentioned PBAs) needs to be worn by the
crew. The Reserve Time determines the time left for the actual
ﬁghting of the route cause: a pressure lower than 527 mmHg re-
quires the crew to wear PBAs, a remaining T.res o10 min de-
mands an immediate isolation of the leak to a segment or in the
worst case the crew needs to evacuate the station.
As a last step of the Initial Response the Soyuz spacecraft,
which would function as rescue vehicles, and the corresponding
adjacent modules (one of the Russian Mini-Research Modules,
MRMs) will be leak checked. This is done by the corresponding
Soyuz crews in parallel using the so-called tap technique: the
hatch is closed and brieﬂy pressed against its sealing. If released it
either automatically opens or it remains closed, dependent on the
pressure gradient between both sides. In case no immediate result
can be derived the hatch is closed for a longer period of time and
the same effect observed. In case the MRM/Soyuz is the leaking
compartment, the ISS itself is considered as healthy and more
analysis will follow on the Soyuz side.
In case MRM/Soyuz is not leaking, crew can enter the Sec-
ondary Response, as shown in Fig. 2, always keeping in mind the
remaining Reserve Time stays over 10 min.
While the check of the MRM/Soyuz integrity is ongoing, air
ﬂow sensors in the Russian segment perform an analysis about the
air stream direction at all Russian hatches. In the ideal case these
measurements provide indications whether the Russian segmentor even which module is leaking or not.
In case the measurements do not provide clues which segment
is perforated, the crew has to manually determine that in the ﬁrst
part of the Secondary Response. This is done by closing the ГA-
PMA1 hatch (see Fig. 3) and hence isolating the Russian segment
from the American segment including the connected Japanese/
European modules. Then the above mentioned tap technique and
pressure measurements in the Russian segment (crew always stays
on the Soyuz¼escape side of the corresponding hatch) indicate
the leaking segment.
Since the target group for our training are European Flight
Controllers whose involvement in Russian segment leaks is mar-
ginal we only focus here on cases with a leak in the non-Russian
part of the ISS. Having determined the American (Japanese/Eur-
opean) segment as cause for the pressure decrease, crew would
now enter the next part of the Secondary Response strategy: The
Module Leak Pinpoint.
To get a rough idea, crew then closes the “Node 2 Aft” hatch in
order to divide the American (Japanese/European) segment by half
to determine which part is the leaking one. Based on the result,
they continue to investigate that part using the strategy to start
with the module which is farthest away from the Russian Seg-
ment/the Soyuz, axial modules (ﬁrst Japanese, then European)
ﬁrst, then moving “backward”. The corresponding module is
checked by closing the hatch and measuring the pressure on the
“escape side” of the hatch: Should the pressure remain steady, then
Fig. 3. The ISS hatch diagram (Jan 2016). Docking ports for the various Russian and non-Russian vehicles are indicated by arrows. Also the direction fromwhich an unlatched
hatch is closed by higher pressure is indicated for each hatch by a small red arrow. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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crew retrieves important equipment prior to isolating the module
(s), since it is likely that the modules cannot be entered for a
prolonged time. Since crew will always stay on the Soyuz side of
the leak, all modules forward of the leaking one are also no longer
accessible, the corresponding hatches remain closed to conserve
the atmosphere in them.
Once the leak has been isolated and crew is safe, the emer-
gency event ends. Nevertheless there might be still the opportu-
nity to re-ingress and repair the leaking module. As a last step of
the Secondary Response crew might then decide – based on the
Reserve Time, the expert recommendations and crew safety –
whether a re-ingress and repair is an option. There are various
ways to seal a leak which are all available on board in a dedicated
ISS Leak Kit. This also contains an Ultrasound detector to locate the
acoustic signature of the escaping air [6]. Also telemetry indica-
tions (equipment damaged by an impact) or the vehicle attitude
changes (escaping air generates a torque) might provide clues.
2.3. Toxic atmosphere
A spill of toxic material scenario is currently not implemented
in the 3D emergency simulator, since the corresponding crew re-
sponses are of less critical nature, do not require extensive inter-
actions with the control centers and are not spread over the entire
vehicle. However, for completeness the toxic spill response shall
also be brieﬂy described here.
Since the reaction is completely different in case of an ammo-
nia release we will treat the latter as a separate case, although they
are usually considered as one.
2.3.1. Non-ammonia toxic spill
The Initial Response for a non-ammonia contingency consists of
the Common Emergency Response and the annunciation of the
emergency which is of particular importance here, since there are
no on-board mechanisms for detection. The annunciation consists
of pressing the corresponding emergency alarm button together
with a previous voice message to ground that the case does not
involve ammonia.
The Secondary Response consists of the determination of the
hazard level of the spilled substance. There are ﬁve levels (0 – non-
hazardous to 4 – most hazardous) deﬁned for the ISS, and everysubstance on board is classiﬁed and labeled accordingly [7]. In case
of an unknown substance, certain rules are applied based on the
containability and the state (gaseous, liquid, solid) to deﬁne a
“working hazard level”.
Based on the determined hazard level the appropriate personal
protection means are donned in the next level of the Secondary
Response. As ﬁnal step a clean-up is attempted, for which various
devices are available on board.
2.3.2. Ammonia release
Ammonia is used in the external American cooling system of
the ISS, which interfaces with the water-based internal cooling
circuits. Therefore intrusion of ammonia is one of the emergency
scenarios and since it is highly lethal, an immediate response is
required [8]. Basically crew immediately escapes to the Russian
part of the ISS, closes the Node 1 aft hatch (see Fig. 3), remove
their clothes and leaves them in the PMA to minimize ammonia
transfer, enters the Russian segment and also closes the hatch to
the PMA. In the Russian segment dedicated Emergency Masks
with ammonia cartridges are donned by the crew and measure-
ments are taken to ensure clean atmosphere there. Based on the
results, the crew must decide on whether they can safely stay in
the Russian segment or need to evacuate the ISS.3. Training requirements and conditions
The training of astronauts [9,10] on emergency responses is
imperative due to their autonomous and central role. However,
Flight Controllers also have emergency training elements in their
certiﬁcation ﬂows [11]. For European Flight Controllers there is
currently an Emergency classroom training available in which the
trainees are introduced into the crew actions in an emergency
case, in the Columbus automatic reaction and their role in such
situations. The training content is deﬁned via Learning Objectives
according to the concept of Instructional System Design [12]. The
Learning Objectives in this training related to the crew actions on a
ﬁre and rapid depress emergency which are hence in scope of the
simulator, are listed in Table 1.
According to Bloom's taxonomy [13] all of them are on the
Comprehension level of the cognitive domain, which is in line
with the future task of a ﬂight controller with regards to the crew
Table 1
Crew action related Learning Objectives for the emergency class room training for
Flight Controllers.
1. Describe the strategy behind the ISS Fire Emergency Responses
2. Describe the functions, use and constraints of hardware/tools used in the ISS Fire
Emergency Response
3. Describe how a 6 person crew responds to an ISS Fire Emergency
4. Describe ISS Emergency Equipment used in Rapid Depress Responses
5. Describe the strategy behind the Rapid Depress Response
6. Summarize the Rapid Depress response dependent upon the ISS Crew
complement
7. Select the procedures used in a Fire/Rapid Depress Release Response
T. Uhlig et al. / Acta Astronautica 128 (2016) 513–520 517emergency actions: They do not have to execute the crew response
by themselves (which would justify the Application level), but just
have to have a broad understanding of what the crew is doing in
order to better interact and assist them. Therefore training in the
past had consisted of classroom lectures and theoretical walk-
throughs through the emergency crew procedures.
According to the concept “learning by doing” [14] an increased
learning efﬁciency is observed where the trainee is directly with
working the procedures and ﬂows, which he/she needs to mem-
orize. Therefore the approach to put a Flight Controller into the
position of an astronaut and let her/him execute the emergency
procedures in a 3D virtual environment seems to be promising. It
will be used in future training sessions to enhance the classroom
lessons and replace the procedure walkthroughs.
A second training element for Flight Controllers with regards to
emergency operations consists of dedicated emergency simula-
tions or normal simulations, which are ended with an emergency
scenario. During these events in the past a European astronaut was
“paper-simulating” an on-board crew member, the Flight Control
Team was placed into the training control room, the reactions of
the space station were mimicked by a software simulator and an
instructor team was surrogating the Houston team. Due to the
high complexity of the scenario and the lack of detailed knowl-
edge of the partner's actions the entire simulation was based on a
pre-prepared script, so deviations are almost impossible and the
“real emergency books” are not used on the instructor's side of the
event. This concept had some additional weaknesses: The avail-
ability of “real” astronauts for simulations was very limited and
hence an additional major constraint in the already complex
scheduling. Their emergency training was sometimes outdated, if
they were not assigned mid-term to a mission (and if they were,
they were no longer available for simulations) and a good Flight
Controller training opportunity (to play the crew) was given away.
The Learning Objectives for these emergency simulations,
which are directly linked to the crew performance on board, were
extracted and pasted in Table 2.
Of course for these simulation scenarios the usage of a virtual
3D simulator in the future is considered beneﬁcial in several as-
pects: A Flight Controller can play the crew and hence is immerged
into the emergency procedures and derives a very broad under-
standing on the crew actions. In addition his expert knowledgeTable 2
Crew action related Learning Objectives for the emergency simulation training for
Flight Controllers.
1. Demonstrate awareness of on-board support equipment usage
2. Maintain awareness of crew emergency strategies and actions
3. Coordinate – and if the situation dictates – communicate effectively between the
crew and ground
4. Demonstrate awareness of crew health/safety during an emergency situationalso allows a simulation which is not only scripted, but can be
more dynamic.4. Simulator realization
4.1. Basic considerations
Although under normal circumstances there are either three or
six astronauts on board, for the ﬁrst implementation of the virtual
training simulator it was decided to follow a one player setup only.
If we assume a three persons crew, one astronaut would then stay
in safe haven and control the ISS systems via a laptop, whereas the
two colleagues – according to the buddy system – would move
forward and tackle the emergency situation . As per procedure
there is no mandatory interaction or job sharing foreseen between
those two, therefore it is a fair assumption that only the trainee is
acting and he/she is silently (and invisibly) shadowed by the
second astronaut.
It was also decided to follow a kind of “mixed reality” approach:
The real world should not be blocked out completely as would be
the case e.g. by using a Head Mounted Display (HMD). Rather the
trainee should be able to interact also with “real world items”
during the simulation so that e.g. the printed versions of the
emergency crew procedures can be used in parallel without hav-
ing to use means of Augmented Reality. With that it is ensured
that the trainee better gets acquainted with the structure of these
procedures, which he also needs to use on console, an electronic
implementation of the procedures for the virtual world (and
subsequent updates of those, which would be additional effort)
can be avoided and the training team can rely on the already ex-
isting in-house conﬁguration control processes to ensure that the
latest version is always used.
4.2. Hardware
At the German Space Operations Center where the Col-CC is
located a so-called CAVE (Cave Automatic Virtual Environment) is
installed. It consists of 5 semi-transparent ﬂat screens horizontally
angled at 135° to each other so that they form a 180° surround
screen system that surrounds the user(s), as depicted in Figs. 4 and
5. Ten projectors located behind the screens as seen from the
human participant project their images onto the screens, thus
enabling stereo back projection by use of linear polarization to
separate the images for the left and right eye respectively. In the
current set-up each projector is connected to its own vision sys-
tem PC, the so-called client PC which renders one channel of the
stereo image pair for the respective portion of the whole 180°
scene view. The vision system PCs are complemented by two ad-
ditional PCs: the master and the server PC. The master PC handles
the user's inputs, controls the simulation application and carriesFig. 4. CAVE System Layout at GSOC.
Fig. 5. CAVE system at GSOC in use (from [15]).
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teract with the running simulation application by use of a con-
ventional Gamepad which is connected to the master PC via a USB
cable connection. The server PC acts as a ﬁle server on which the
actual executable ﬁles of the simulation programs are located and
made available to all other PCs via disc mounting. The server PC
also acts as the central control entity for the whole system, with
which the operator can start up and shut down the computers and
the projectors or choose which simulation application to run. For
this the server PC is connected to a touch screen monitor at the
front side of the CAVE system on which the Graphical User Inter-
face of the control application is displayed. All computers and the
projectors are connected via a local network (LAN). This system is
intended to provide a Virtual Reality capability with which in
general planning, preparation and execution of space projects can
be supported. In recent times it was also used to demonstrate
actual projects operated by GSOC like Columbus to the interested
public.
4.3. Software and implementation
Unlike most other applications in the area of training, simula-
tion and scientiﬁc visualization, the virtual ISS emergency scenario
simulation was developed with the help of a commercial game
engine (in this case Unity) as the development environment. The
main reason for this decision was that development of the simu-
lation application would mainly be done by bachelor and mastersFig. 6. The Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA) is highlightstudents, interns and student trainees who not necessarily would
have prior experience in common graphics APIs or frameworks
like OpenGL. Unity provides an easy-to-learn development en-
vironment with a user interface which is oriented more towards
usual 3D graphics programs. Its ease-of-use is supported by a very
active user community and a vast amount of training material and
content at little or no cost. It offers the possibility to create visually
appealing applications with limited programming effort all within
a complete development environment including a graphical scene
editor, built-in physics engine and tools for creating animations
besides other valuable features. Also Unity is very popular espe-
cially among independent game developers, students and hobby-
ists also due to its advantageous licensing policy. In addition Unity
makes it easy to deploy the applications for a multitude of devices
ranging from desktop PCs, game consoles to smartphones and VR
headsets like Oculus Rift and GearVR. This offers the possibility to
use additional training media beside the CAVE system described
here. In the future the range of training media could be expanded
to include also simulation applications running on mobile devices
like smartphones, tablet computers and mobile VR headsets so
that Flight Controllers, but probably also astronauts can use them
in nearly any location.
4.4. Implementation of the emergency scenarios
The ﬁrst step in developing a simulation scenario with a
computer game engine like Unity is to create the respective 3D
content (the virtual world) with which the user should interact. In
our case the virtual world consists of the interior of the ISS and
includes all necessary equipment for handling the emergency
cases. When developing the prototype for the emergency scenario
simulator the main focus was put on the overall functionality and
on supporting the learning objectives of the emergency training
rather than creating a highly realistic virtual environment at ﬁrst.
So detailing the interior of the ISS to a level of photorealistic re-
presentation was not given a high priority since this was not
considered crucial for running the emergency procedures, and
would probably be more distracting than helpful. Furthermore the
level of detail of the 3D objects of the virtual environment was
kept relatively simple to regard the overall frame rate of the si-
mulation. For the simulation execution a ﬁrst person view was
chosen, which is quite common among computer games. In this
scenario the trainee assumes the role of one of the astronauts oned, before the participants can “pick it up” (from [15]).
Fig. 7. Tool-tip like information (upper left) displayed when highlighting an object
(from [15]).
Table 3
Currently implemented emergency equipment with interaction possibility.
 Press alarm button on corresponding panel
 Operate (close/open, latch/unlatch, usage as delta pressure indicator) the hatches
 Discharge Fire Extinguisher, also with nozzle in ﬁre ports
 Wear Portable Breathing Apparatus (trainee's ﬁeld of sight becomes obstructed)
 Perform CSA-CP measurement (including additional sampling probe SP 402) of
combustion by-products
 Perform pressure measurements with Manovacumeter
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situation. The trainee can navigate through the virtual space sta-
tion using a Gamepad. He or she can interact with the virtual
objects by pointing a bracket shaped cursor at the desired object
which is then highlighted (see Fig. 6). In order to reduce eye strain
in the stereo environment the spatial depth of the cursor within
the virtual world is matched to the object which it is traversing
thus eliminating conﬂicting visual depth cues. The interaction of
the user with the virtual objects is further supported by tooltip-
like information which is displayed next to the object the user is
pointing at, as depicted in Fig. 7. This information is basically used
to show the user how to interact with the object in focus. This
behavior of course compromises somehow the full immersion of
the user into the virtual world as this information would be a so-
called non-diegetic representation [15,16], one that would not
exist in the real world. But as we have laid out in Section 4.1 a full
immersion of the user was not intended as he/she would have to
use non-virtual equipment in parallel during the training lessons
anyway.
In the same manner also a map of the ISS in which the actual
position and looking direction of the virtual self is indicated by aFig. 8. A map of the ISS is integrated in the display of the trainee (from [15]).green dot can be integrated in the view to ease the navigation
through the station, as depicted in Fig. 8.
All emergency equipment was modeled to a somehow realistic
but still simpliﬁed degree to allow some understanding of what
the crew is working with in orbit, but since the learning objective
is not the correct and detailed handling of this equipment, its
operation was simpliﬁed and sometimes adapted in order to be
better usable in the virtual environment. For example analog
gauges of measuring devices were substituted with digital displays
in order to enhance readability as the monitors and/or projectors
which display the virtual world to the user would run at limited
resolutions.
The trainee can pick up several equipment items but can only
operate one at a time (with the exception of the portable breathing
apparatus which can be used in conjunction with other items as
well). He/she can choose which one to use by toggling through the
stack of items by pressing a button on the game pad, see also
Table 3.
4.5. Control and evolution of the simulation scenario
In the above mentioned computer network of the simulation
environment it is also possible to include a PC which is then
conﬁgured with an instructor display. This allows an instructor to
follow the ongoing simulation with some supplemental informa-
tion (e.g. constantly updated pressure readings of all modules) and
options to control the simulation. The emergency scenario can be
selected (ﬁre/rapid depress) as well as the location of the ﬁre/the
leak and the leak rate. In the ﬁre case based on that input a
mathematical algorithm calculates the values for the three “mea-
sured” combustion products (CO, HCl, HCN) and constantly up-
dates the values over time for all modules as well as for all ﬁre port
locations. It is up to the instructor to determine whether an
equipment power down, a PFE discharge or a full module pow-
erdown then kills the ﬁre and ensures decreasing values.
For the depress case the leaking module, the current leak rate
(inﬂuenced by the remaining pressure within the leaking module)
and the open/close status of all hatches are the parameters of the
algorithm, which calculates the current pressure for each module,
which is then used as input for the Manovacumeter display the
student can see.5. First experiences and further development
Currently, the simulator is used in a stand-alone conﬁguration
for test purposes and to gain ﬁrst-hand experience. The trainee is
performing inside the CAVE whereas the instructor plays the part
of the control center from outside the simulator. As a next step it is
foreseen to introduce the simulator in the procedure walkthroughs
of the emergency classroom training. Then the different roles can
be shared among the student: one is playing the crew, one the
control center(s) and others can follow the scenario from outside
and comment or ask questions.
T. Uhlig et al. / Acta Astronautica 128 (2016) 513–520520The last step is then its usage during emergency simulations, in
which a full Col-CC ﬂight control team in the training control room
interacts with the colleague playing the crew in the simulator. For
that setup, some administrative and technical hurdles have to be
overcome, because a data/video/voice link between the high se-
curity area of a control room and the public environment of the
CAVE triggers some security concerns.
To use the simulator during emergency simulation it is required
to connect the simulator CAVE with the control room intercom
system, which then establishes the possibility of direct interac-
tions between the student in the virtual environment and the
Flight Controllers.
A video feed of the virtual scenario into the control roomwould
also be an interesting option, but would not be mandatory how-
ever. This would also require the implementation of an avatar as
the visual representation of the virtual astronaut. Since all Flight
Control Team simulations are controlled, directed and observed
from a dedicated simulation control room, this room also would
need to be connected to the simulator network to allow the sim
ofﬁcers to also control and oversee the simulation running in the
CAVE.
There is also ongoing work to link the 3D virtual simulator to a
dedicated Columbus simulator [17], which generates Columbus
telemetry for the control room displays and reacts on tele-
commands of the Flight Controllers. This way a Flight Controller
playing the crew would immediately “see” the result of any ground
action on the astronauts, e.g. that removing the power on dedi-
cated channels would cause a turned off light on board/in the
virtual world. Also commands sent by the astronauts via the cor-
responding laptops in the virtual world can inﬂuence the tele-
metry indicated on ground side.
A future usage in the DLR School lab [18] for educational pur-
poses is also foreseen.6. Conclusion
The novel concept of ISS emergency simulations for Flight
Controllers using virtual reality increases the awareness of the
ground personnel for the crew actions in an ISS emergency case,
and the efﬁcacy of emergency training is expected to grow by the
more immediate “immersion” of the trainees in the scenario. The
independency of emergency training events from certiﬁed astro-
naut support makes them more ﬂexible and could help to increase
their frequency.Acknowledgment
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